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The Role of State and Federal Courts in
State Legislative ReapportionmentThe New York Conflict
The achievement of satisfactory remedies for state legislative malapportionment has been impeded by uncertainty as to the roles of federal and state courts. Cooperation between these courts appearsnecessary if a plan is to
be devised satisfying both federal and state constitutional
requirements.This Note examines the recent reapportionment litigationin New York which culminated in a federally orderedelection of legislatorsunder a plan violating
the state constitution.After exploring alternativeactions
which might have lessened the chance of a state-federal
conflict, the authorproposes a new approachto the problem. It is suggested that state courts be encouraged to
assume a largerrole in protecting both federal and state
requirements.
I. THE NEW YORK LITIGATION
On November 9, 1965, voters in New York elected legislators in
a federally ordered election pursuant to a state legislative reapportionment plan. This plan had been previously declared by the
New York Court of Appeals to be in violation of the state constitution.
The first significant point in the New York reapportionment
litigation was the 1964 decision of the United States Supreme
Court in WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo.' The Court, in deciding this
and five other reapportionment cases, 2 held that the constitu1. 377 U.S. 633 (1964). The litigation began in 1962 when the federal
district court dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction in WIICA, Inc.
v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The Supreme Court vacated the
dismissal and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190 (1962). Upon
remand, the district court held the New York apportionment law to be valid,
finding no invidious discrimination and a rational state policy. WMICA, Inc.
v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); see Zanoni, WMCA v. Lomenzo:
A Case Study of Politicsin Reapportionment Litigation, 1 COLum. J. OF L. &
Socil PROBLMS 1 (1965) (detailed discussion of the earlier litigation).
2. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly v. Lucas, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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tional standard under the fourteenth amendment for both houses
of a bicameral legislature was "one man, one vote." 3 Noting that
the last apportionment in New York had been in 1953, the Court
held that, even using 1960 population statistics, reapportionment
under the existing New York statutory and constitutional scheme4
was not constitutionally sustainable. 5 The Court then remanded
the case to the district court for determination of whether the 1964
election should be held under the existing apportionment!
On remand, in July 1964, the district court ordered that the
1964 election be held, but that the terms of those elected be one
year rather than two years as provided in the New York Constitution.7 In addition, it was ordered that a special election be
held in November 1965, under a federally acceptable reapportionment plan to be enacted by the state legislature and submitted to
the district court for approval by April 11, 1965! The terms again
3. The phrase first appeared in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963):
"The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence
. . . to the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only
one thing- one person, one vote."
4. The number of assemblymen is set by the constitution at a maximum
of 150 members. N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 2. The ratio by which these seats
are apportioned is obtained by dividing the number of assemblymen into the
state population. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5. Every county containing less than
one and one-half "ratios" gets one seat; all other counties get two seats; and
the remainder of the seats go to counties with over two "ratios." N.Y. CoNST.
art. IT, § 5. The senate "ratio" is obtained by dividing the population by
fifty; one seat is apportioned for each full "ratio" to each county having six
or more of citizen population. Populous counties are restricted by three
mandatory rules: (1) no county may have more than three seats unless it has
a full "ratio" for each seat; (2) no county may have more than one-third of
the seats; (8) no two adjacent counties may have more than one-half of all
the seats. N.Y. CONST. art. 1II, § 4. For a full description of the New York
scheme, see Silva, The PopulationBase for Apportionme t of the New York
Legislature, 32 FomuH
L. REV. 1 (1963); Silva, Apportionment of the New
York Assembly, 31 FoRDnsn L. REv. 1 (1962).
5. The Court was not specific as to which parts of the state scheme were
unconstitutional. Its controlling principle was that "state constitutional provisions should be deemed violative of the federal constitution only when
validly asserted constitutional rights could not otherwise be protected and
effectuated." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964).
6. In a suit to enjoin enforcement of a state statute, the application must
be heard by a district court of three judges, and a direct appeal lies to the
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281 (1964).
7. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, XI National Municipal League, Court Decisions on Legislative Reapportionment 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd sub nom.
Hughes v. WMCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965).
8. At plaintiff's request, the court extended the deadline to May 5, 1965,
after the state court had held the legislative plan to be unconstitutional. Brief
for Appellees, p. 2, Travia v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 9 (1965).
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were to be one year; the normal two year terms were to be resumed
with the regularly scheduled 1966 elections
The New York legislature convened in special session in December 196410 and passed four reapportionment plans 1 in designated order for court consideration. The first plan to be found
constitutional by the district court was to become the apportionment law for the state. The reapportionment plans were submitted to the court in January 1965.12 It rejected three of the
plans," but held that chapter 976 (Plan A) complied with the
9. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in the affirmance of this order, intimated
that the district court retained power to modify or vacate that portion of the
order calling for a 1965 election. Hughes v. WMCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694, 695
(1965).
10. This was a "lame duck" Republican legislature called into special
session by the Republican governor. The legislature elected in November
1964, which would convene in January 1965, was controlled by Democrats.
For a discussion of political aspects of the New York reapportionment controversy see VmGnntA CoMmIssioN oN CONSTrrUTONL GovmmmwT, Tun
SUPREmE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: A RLEvEw OF TEE 1964 TERM 15--24

(1965).
11. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 976 (Plan A), provided for a senate of 65
members and an assembly of 165 members, each with a single vote; counties
were combined and divided to achieve districts of substantially equal citizen
population. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 977-78 (Plan B), provided for a senate
of 65 members and an assembly of 180 members, each with a single vote;
counties were combined and divided to achieve districts of substantially equal
voter population. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 979 (Plan C), provided for a senate of 65 members with single votes and an assembly of 186 members with
fractional voting ranging from 1/6 of a vote to 1 full vote; assembly districts
were contained within counties, and districts were based on citizen population.
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 981 (Plan D), provided for a senate of 65 members
with whole votes and an assembly of 174 members, 127 of whom had whole
votes and 47 of whom had fractional votes ranging from 3/4 to 1/6; the districts were based on voter population. Plans B, C, and D were declared unconstitutional before the session laws were printed in a bound volume, therefore chapters 977-81 were not printed therein. For a discussion -thereof, see
the case which held them to be unconstitutional, WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo,
238 F. Supp. 916, 919-20 (1965).
12. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), ap'peal
dismissed, 382 U.S. 4 (1965).
18. The court found fractional voting unsatisfactory as a permanent
solution under the "one man, one vote" standard. It reasoned that a representative with one-sixth of a vote would be giving greater proportional representation to his constituency than would a representative with a whole vote
because of the realities of the legislative process- debate, party caucuses,
committee assignments, etc. The court found voter population as a 'basis for
apportionment to violate equal protection because, at least in New York, it
would perpetuate discrimination against urban areas. It did say, however,
that voter population as a basis might not be found unsatisfactory in every
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fourteenth amendment and its order'of July 1964. The court refused to consider objections that Plan A violated the state constitution or to stay proceedings pending a state decision on these
questions. Furthermore, it refused to enjoin the parties from proceeding in the state courts.
Shortly thereafter in In the Matter of Orans,1 4 Plan A was held
to violate the state constitution by a lower state court. Reasoning
that the constitutional provision limiting the number of assemblymen to 150 survived the Supreme Court decision in Lomenzo, the
court declared Plan A invalid because it called for 165 members in
the assembly. Since the state constitution required senate and
assembly apportionment in the same law, the senate apportionment in Plan A could not stand alone. On April 14, 1965, the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the unconstitutionality of

Plan A.15

On May 10, a majority of the three-man district court, recognizing that Plan A was ineffective as a legislative act, nonetheless
ordered that the districting scheme and procedures set forth in it
V '
be used as the basis for an election to be held in November 1965.
The effect of the order was delayed until May 24 to give the leg17
islature further time to act.
case. The court also placed significant emphasis on the fact that Plan A was
the most traditional of the four plans. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp.
916, 922-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
14. 45 Misc. 2d 616, 257 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct.), afd, 15 N.Y.2d 839,
206 NXE.2d 854, 258 N.Y.S.2d 825, appeal dismissed sub no=. Rockefeller v.
Orans, 382 U.S. 10 (1965).
15. In the Matter of Orans, 15 N.Y.2d 339, 206 N.E.2d 854, 258 N.Y.S.2d
825, appeal dismissed sub nom. Rockefeller v. Orans, 382 U.S. 10 (1965). The
court also found prima facie violations of the "town and block" rule, but
the court of appeals concluded its opinion by stating that it was "inappropriate
to pass any comment on these statements."
16. Both the May 10 and May 24 orders by the district court were given
orally. Judge Levet, dissenting, suggested weighted voting as an alternative.
See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 246 F. Supp. 953, 958 (S.D.N.Y.), motion to stay
the order and to accelerate the appeal denied sub norm. Travia v. Lomenzo,
381 U.S. 431 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. The legislature attempted to redistrict in accordance with the state
court ruling but no plan was completed and no bill was introduced. On May
24 the legislature passed three relevant bills. One bill adopted the weighted
voting formula advocated by the dissenting district court judge on May 10.
The second bill created a bipartisan committee to formulate a reapportionment plan to meet the requirements of both state and federal constitutions
for 1966 elections. The third bill issued a call for a constitutional convention
to devise a permanent plan for the 1968 and subsequent elections. See Travia
v. Lomenzo, upra note 16, at 484.
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On July 9, 1965, the New York Court of Appeals issued an in-8
junction prohibiting the holding of the November 1965 election.'
Reasoning that the federal district court's order of May 24 was
not "final and binding," the court held that it was obligated to
prevent an election violating the state constitutional provisions
fixing the number of assembly seats at 150 and requiring elections
every two years. 9 The majority opinion suggested weighted voting
as an alternative; the concurring opinion suggested an election at
large. The district court's immediate response was to make clear
that its May 24 order had been "final and binding" and to enjoin
anyone from interfering with the November election. ° The Supreme Court refused to stay this order pending appeal2l and later
m
dismissed the appeal.2

IT. THE ROLE OF TUE JUDICIARY
IN REAPPORTIONMENT
Significant judicial involvement in reapportionment problems
began with Baker v. Carr23 in which the Court held apportionment was subject to judicial review and presented a federal question under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.L2 4 Initially, the Court appeared committed to a standard of
18. Glinski v. Lomenzo, 16 N.Y.2d 27, 209 NLE.2d 277, 261 N.Y.S.2d 281
(1965).
19. The objection to the one year term had not been raised in the lower
courts.
20. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 246 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
21. Travia v. Lomenzo, 86 Sup. Ct. 7, 15 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1965).
22. Travia v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 9 (1965). On August 24, 1965, the state
supreme court assumed a supervisory role in the controversy, imposing a deadline on the legislature for submission of a plan conforming to both state and
federal constitutions, and retaining jurisdiction to formulate a plan in the
event the legislature failed to meet its deadline. In the Matter of Orans, 47
Mise.2d 493, 262 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1965). After the legislature failed to
act, the New York Court of Appeals adopted its own plan. N.Y. Times, March
23, 1966, p. 1, col. 8.
23. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
24. Prior to Baker v. Carr, the issues were deemed political questions. See
Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957) (per curiam); Kidd v. McCanless, 352
U.S. 920 (1956) (per curiam); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (per
curiam); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (per curiam); Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Other rationales used by the Supreme Court to
avoid constitutional challenges to state apportionment laws included lack of a
federal question and existence of an adequate state remedy. See, e.g.,
Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952);
Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1982).
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"invidious discrimination" 25 for testing the constitutionality of an
apportionment scheme 6 Although there was some indication of
the Court's ultimate position, 27 it was not until the Court decided
Lomenzo and the five other state apportionment cases that a clear
standard appeared.
But application of the "one man, one vote" standard to both
houses of a state legislature introduced a new problem in federal
judicial handling of malapportionment. Heretofore courts had
been dealing primarily with legislative apathy in following the
obvious dictates of state constitutional provisions assumed to be
valid under the federal constitution. s In such situations, effective
judicial relief can be provided without difficulty. Many state constitutions, however, have apportionment schemes which, taken as
a whole, violate the new standard.F9 In such situations the task of
the court is complicated by the necessity of accommodating the
relief ordered to requirements of parts of the scheme not inconsistent with the "one man, one vote" standardV2 This necessity is
predicated upon the assumption that: "state constitutional pro25. Members of the Court disagreed as to the meaning of this standard.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (opinion of the Court by Brennan, J.); id. at 242-50 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 253-58 (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 830-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. It was under this test that the district court initially upheld the apportionment scheme in New York. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
27. In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), the Georgia county unit system for primaries was held to violate the fourteenth amendment standard of
one person, one vote, but the case was distinguished from legislative apportionment situations. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the existing
congressional districting plan was declared unconstitutional because it diluted
the voting strength of certain voters.
28. See Davis v. McCarty, 888 P.2d 480 (Okla. 1964) where the state
court assumed that compliance with the state constitution would satisfy the
federal constitution; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). But see Sobel
v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (D. Fla. 1962).
29. lMr. Justice Harlan contends all but eleven state constitutions would
violate the standard. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 538, 611 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).
30. In New York the limitation of the assembly to 150 seats, together with
the method of distributing seats to political subdivisions, see note 4 supra,
caused the system as a whole to be unconstitutional. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo,
377 U.S. 633, 650 (1964). Neither a limit of 150 members nor a requirement of
one seat for each county alone would violate the federal constitution although
in New York, if the smallest county were given a seat, the assembly would
need over 1000 seats to afford equal representation on a system of whole
votes.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:714

visions should be deemed violative of the Federal Constitution
only when validly asserted constitutional rights could not otherwise be protected and effectuated."3 1 The same problem of accommodating state constitutional provisions must be faced by a
legislature when ordered to submit a new apportionment plan
complying with a federal court order.82 Determining which provisions remain operative, despite the invalidity of the scheme as
a whole, requires an interpretation of the state constitution. Such
interpretation should consider the language of the plan, the
framers' intent, and the political history of the state, in light of
the federal decree. 3 This responsibility is shared by the state
courts, who have been urged by4 federal courts to interpret and
0
enforce their own constitutions.
Cooperation among these three bodies in remedying malapportionment is dictated by two fundamental positions of the federal
judiciary: A federal court should defer to state decisions on state
problems; 5 the political nature of apportionment questions favor
achieving a solution through the legislative process.3 6 However,
since an asserted deprivation of voting rights presents a federal
claim for relief, the federal court has primary responsibility for
fashioning a solution within a relatively short period of time.7
81. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964).

32. The Citizen's Committee on Reapportionment reported to the state
legislature: "There is no clear-cut method of determining which sentences or
parts of sentences contained in sections 3, 4, and 5 of Article III of the State
Constitution have withstood the decision of the Supreme Court in the WMCA
case." McKinney's Session Law News, Feb. 25, 1965, 187th Sess., 2d Extraordinary Sess. 1964, p. A-13. Significantly, the section which contained the maximum number of seats (art. I, § 2) was not mentioned and apparently was
assumed by both the Citizen's Committee and the legislature to have fallen.
Id. at 8-A.
33. It was argued in New York that all of the provisions relating to reapportionment were so intertwined and interrelated that if one fell they all must
fall. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
34. Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965); Scranton v. Drew, 379 U.S.
40 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656
(1964).
35. See Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly v. Lucas, 379 U.S. 693 (1964), where
it was said that the district court could abstain on the question of severability
of the reapportionment amendment to the state constitution pending a reasonably prompt settlement of the issue in the state court.
36. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
37. "[O]nce a State's legislative apportionment scheme has been found
unconstitutional, it would be the unusual case in which a court would be
justified in not taking appropriate action to insure that no further elections
are conducted under the invalid plan ... .." Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 36,
at 585.
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Although standards for effecting the right to an equal vote remain
unsettled,38 it is clear that neither legislative inertia nor state
decisions can stand in the way of effective relief. 9 If a state fails
to fashion a satisfactory solution within the time fixed by the
federal court, some less ideal but federally acceptable relief must
be devised. 0
MIl. PROPRIETY OF THE DISTRICT COURT ORDER
The federal district court clearly had the power to adopt a
federally acceptable plan. Hence, the propriety of its ordering an
election under Plan A must be judged by its rationale and by
available alternatives.

A.

RATIONALE

First, it could have eliminated any objection to its reliance
upon invalid legislation by holding that the state constitutional
provisions were no longer viable as a matter of federal Jaw. Such
a holding would apply most clearly to the biennial election provision since an immediate election is a discretionary remedy under
Supreme Court decisions.41 With respect to the limitation of the
38. In Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 711 (1964), the Court stated that
despite the fact that legislative apportionment has traditionally been treated
as a state constitutional matter, the Court will not delay and deprive plaintiff an adequate representative voice. The determination of an appropriate
remedy will be made on equitable grounds. The statement indicates that the
remedy is dependant on equitable considerations rather than any set and
observable standards. The Court further warned in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 578 (1964), that "what is marginally permissible in one State may be
unsatisfactory in another, depending upon the particular circumstances of
the case."
39. Federal courts are bound by a state court decision only if no federal
question is involved and the state decision does not conflict with the federal
constitution. See Valenti v. Dempsey, 211 F. Supp. 911 (D. Conn. 1962);
Jordan v. Green, 173 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1965); Hutchinson v. Cooley, 214 A.2d
828 (Vt. 1965); 35A C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure § 271 (1960).
40. See Nolan v. Rhodes, 84 U.S.L. Wmm 3281 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1966); Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 1965); Herweg v. Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, 246 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mont. 1965).
41. See Davis v. Mann, S79 U.S. 696 (1965); Hughes v. WMCA, Inc., 379
U.S. 694 (1965). Both of these cases approved cutting short legislative terms
in order to accelerate reapportionment. Further, the state court had not expressed a binding opinion on the length of legislative terms if Plan A were to
be used. N.Y. CoNST. art. TI, § 2 provides both for two year terms and elections in even numbered years. Under the state court solution of weighted
voting the state court did not have to choose between one year terms or

switching to odd number years. Thus in using Plan A the district court's disre-
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assembly to 150 seats, it could be argued that the dominant element of the New York constitutional scheme was the preservation
of counties as political subdivisions of the state. 42 Since this feature - not in itself unconstitutional - survived the WMCA decision, the federal right to equal representation demanded more
than 150 seats in the assembly. However, the converse of this
argument could be asserted by regarding the 150 member limit
as more central to the state constitutional scheme than representation of each county in the assembly. Although it was clear that
one requirement or the other must have fallen as a matter of
federal law, the district court thought the question of which was
more central to the state scheme was better left to the state
courts.43 Thus it consistently maintained that the 150 member
limitation could remain operative as a matter of federal law.
Second, the district court could have held that the limitation
had fallen by reasoning that a state legislature has inherent power
to interpret the state constitution, coextensive with a state
court. 44 Plan A could have been deemed a valid legislative act
despite the decision of the court of appeals. Appealing as this
notion may be, however, it seems clear that the division of power
between a state's legislature and judiciary must be determined
under state law 4 5 Thus, the federal district court would be
justified in accepting the legislature's interpretation of the state
constitution only if the state court conceded that the legislature
gard of the objection to the one year terms could be read as an attempt to
accommodate the state constitution.
42. See In the Matter of Orans, 15 N.Y.2d 339, 355, 258 N.Y.S.2d 825,
836 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (dissenting opinion).
43. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
44. See Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 877 U.S. 656,
675-76 (1964):
With the Maryland Constitutional provisions relating to legislative
reapportionment hereby held unconstitutional, the Maryland Legislature
presumably has the inherent power to enact at least temporary reapportionment legislation pending adoption of state constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment which comport with federal
constitutional requirements.
See also Jordan v. Green, 173 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1965); Smith v. Buraczynski,
214 A.2d 826 (Vt. 1965) (legislature gets power to reapportion from federal
courts not state constitution).
45. Despite its statement in Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v.
Tawes, supra note 44, when presented with an appeal from the New York
state court decision which found no such inherent power in the legislature, the
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a federal question. Rockefeller
v. Orans, 382 U.S. 10 (1965). The Court apparently left the question of the
legislature's power to interpret the state constitution to the state courts.
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had this power. To adopt this rationale in the face of the court
of appeals decision holding Plan A invalid would have been a
clear affront and an unwarranted intrusion into state affairs. The
district court, however, conceded that Plan A was not a valid
legislative act since the court of appeals had held that it violated
the state constitution."

B.

ALTERNATIVEs

In adopting Plan A as its own judicial solution, the district
court was faced with at least five alternatives. Since no districting
plan satisfying both federal and state constitutions had been submitted to it, the alternatives were to postpone any action until
1966, allow the existing legislature to return with weighted votes,
order an election at large, order an election under Plan A, or devise
its own districting plan.
Weighted voting or postponement of the election until 1966
would prejudice the federal right of New York residents to an
equal vote. Hence, neither was a realistic alternative because
they were not federally acceptable. Moreover, the state courts had
never settled the doubts of the district court concerning the
validity of an election at large under the New York Constitution.
An election at large could have denied minority groups and small
state subdivisions a voice in the legislature,4" and a ballot with
46. See note 72 infra.
47. The system of weighted voting suggested by Judge Levet in dissenting
from the May 10 district court decision [excerpts may be found in WMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 246 F. Supp. 953, 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)] would have produced much greater inequities than the system of fractional voting held unconstitutional by the district court in WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp.
916, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The disparity in voting power under the fractional
voting plans was from .17 to 1. Under the suggested plan of weighted voting
the range would have been from .13 to 2.9 with only 9,8 of the 150 members
having votes in the normal range from .9 to 1.1. Brief for Appellee, p. 11,
Travia v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 9 (1965). Computation of votes and determination of committee action would have involved difficult problems. Moreover,
the apparent inequities in the system favored the sparsely populated regions
of the state whose dominance in the legislature was the main target of the
WMCA decision.
With regard to postponement of the election see Swann v. Adams, 86 Sup. Ct.
767 (1966), which reversed the lower court decision allowing a 1966 election
under an improved but still unconstitutional plan. The Court held that the
1966 election must be held under a constitutional plan.
48. See notes 90-92 infra and accompanying text. However, the Citizen's
Committee on Reapportionment noted that an enlarged house might aid the
efficiency of its undertakings. Mcinney's Session Law News (N.Y.) Feb. 25,
1965, 187th Session- 2d Extraordinary Session 1964, p. 8-A.
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over 400 candidates would have been confusing. Faced with such
doubts as to the validity of an at large election, it was not unreasonable for the district court to prefer a traditional election under
Plan A.
Perhaps the most attractive alternative in such a situation
would be a judicially drawn plan accommodating both federal
and state constitutional requirements. 49 However, the pressure of
time and the complexity of the New York requirements for districting made it improbable that such a plan could have been
prepared in time for November elections. Moreover, since the
state courts left a number of constitutional issues unsettled, the
district court could not be certain its plan would satisfy all requirements of the state constitution which might subsequently be
held still operative by the state courts. If unsuccessful, a courtdevised plan would have nothing but the effort to recommend
itself over Plan A. It would have the undesirable effect of shaping
a state's political future through judicial rather than legislative
means.
IV.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL
AND STATE COURTS

The only regrettable effect of the district court's decision to
use Plan A was that it led to a confrontation between federal and
state judicial power. This conflict raises questions as to the
propriety of actions taken by both the federal district court and
the New York courts during the course of the protracted litigation.
A.

AcTioNs OF THE DisTRhiT COURT

Several suggestions were made to the district court, before the
March 15 state court decision declaring Plan A unconstitutional,
which might have avoided a conflict with the state courts. Presumably the district courts' measures for remedying malapportionment are circumscribed only by the following guidelines established
by the Supreme Court: The district court should set a reasonable
period of time within which the state legislature may reapportion
itself;5 0 state courts should settle state questions so long as their
decisions do not conflict with the protection and effectuation of
49. See Nolan v. Rhodes, 84 U.S.L. Wmx 3281 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1966); Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 86 (D.NI). 1965); Herweg v. Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, 246 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mont. 1965).
50. Reynolds v. Sims, 877 U.S. 588, 586 (1964).
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federal rights;"' and the district court should determine whether5 a2
solution is federally acceptable on the circumstances in each case.
The first and most obvious alternative would have been for
the district court to grant a longer time for compliance. 5 There
seems to be no constitutionally established period of time in
which reapportionment must be accomplished.54 The courts'
formal obligation is to balance the interests of the state against
the right of the deprived voter to be equally represented.5 In
practice, however, the objective of a period of grace would seem
to be the achievement of a legislative plan which complies with
both the state and federal constitutions. To achieve this, the
time period must be long enough to allow for enactment of a
legislative plan, litigation in the state courts, and correction of
an unsatisfactory plan by the legislature.
When the district court rendered its decision in January 1965,
it was clear that the legislative plans were going to be considered
in the state courts. The time required for such litigation was
difficult to estimate. 6 However, as long as it was possible that
51. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly v. Lucas, 379 U.S. 693 (1965).
52. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 711 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377

U.S. 533, 578 (1964).
53. For arguments against haste in forcing reapportionment see Dixon,
Reapportionment. What the Courts Didi'et Do, The Reporter, Oct. 8, 1964,
p. 41; Note, 72 YA x L. 968, 1019-27 (1963).
54. See Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 552-53 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes,
377 U.S. 656, 675 (1964). In Tawes the Court allowed the malapportioned
legislatures to remain in existence until 1967.
55. The tone of the Supreme Court decisions has been that once the state
scheme has been declared unconstitutional the right to an immediate decree is
established. The Court, however, usually remands the case to the district court
to establish an acceptable time period for compliance. See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Sims, supranote 54, at 585. In Scott v. Germano, supra note 54, the Supreme
Court deferred to state court attempts to reapportion, in part on the ground
that the state court's jurisdiction was invoked first. However, the Court held
that the period of time within which the state court could reapportion was
limited. Thus, the period of compliance would seem to be a question for federal
determination rather than a prerogative of jurisdiction.
56. One of the better time saving devices, interrogatories by the legislature
to the highest state court seeking a decision as to the constitutionality of its
plan or plans, would not seem to have been available in New York. This approach was suggested by the majority in White v. Anderson, 394 Pa2d 333,
338 (Colo. 1964), and used by the Alabama Legislature. Opinion of the Justices,
178 So. 2d 641 (Ala. 1965).
The New York Constitution requires that an action to review apportionment legislation be brought by a citizen in a lower state court; it can be
heard by the highest state court on appeal only. N.Y. CONST. art. MI, § 5;
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state court proceedings would be completed in time to allow reconsideration by the legislature, the district court's position would
seem to be justifiableU Since the objective is to achieve apportionment in the shortest time possible, the district court should begin
with a realistic but optimistic time estimate. It was always within
its power to extend the time period if necessary s
It was also suggested to the district court that it stay proceedings pending a decision of the state court on whether the
plans complied with the state constitution 9 The court refused
to wait because it felt the state was entitled to know immediately
whether the legislative plan satisfied the federal constitution, and
because no state proceeding had been started before federal jurisdiction was invoked.
Since the state and federal courts were to decide different questions, the only purpose of abstention would have been to avoid an
unnecesary decision by the federal court if the state courts found
all plans to be unsatisfactory. Even in that situation, however, a
federal court decision would give direction to the legislature.
Moreover, there was no basis for assuming that a rejection of all
plans by the state courts would preclude a decision by the federal
court. The subsequent action of the district court demonstrated
its power to order an election under a plan violating the state
art. VI, § 3(a). A decision by the highest state court is necessary both to settle
the issue for the legislature and to bind the federal courts. See White v.
Anderson, aupra; 36 C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure § 171, at 393 (1960).
In any event, the district court had the assurance that the New York courts
would proceed with all due speed. See N.Y. CoNST. art. M, § 5.
57. It would appear that the state legislature did have enough time to
enact a new plan. The legislature was put on notice by the March decision of
the lower New York court that Plan A was unconstitutional. The legislature
could have authorized the Citizen's Commission to devise alternative plans in
anticipation of the court of appeals decision or could have done so itself. The
federal district court extended the time period after the lower court decision
until May 5, and ultimately extended the period for compliance until May
24. Thus even if the legislature 'had waited until the court of appeals decision
on April 15, it still had enough time to devise a new plan. The task of revising
the enrollment books listing of registered voters did not have to be completed
until June 29. N.Y. EnEcTIoN LAw § 186, subd. 5. June 1 was the last day for
county chairmen to notify the election board of party positions to be filled.
N.Y. ELacTioN L&w § 18.
58. See Hughes v. WMCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965).
59. Abstention of the federal court on a state question should be distinguished from equitable abstention which is the postponement of any exercise of federal jurisdiction and remand of both the federal and state questions
to the state court. It would not seem inconsistent with the former to decide
the federal question prior to the state court determination.
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constitution; hence there was no basis for objecting to a decision
merely declaring that one or more of the plans was in conformity
with its previous order. Finally, the district court's failure to
abstain did not damage state-federal relations. A federal decision
after the state court had held all plans unconstitutional would
be no less an affront to the state court than not waiting for its
decision.
The federal district court also rejected the request to enjoin
the state court action.60 The denial was consistent with the federal court's position that the state courts were free to decide
state constitutional issues. A decision on such issues, insofar as
it did not impinge on federal rights, would jeopardize neither the
jurisdiction nor the judgment of the district court.61 Although an
injunction would have avoided the ultimate conflict between
courts, more damage would have been done to state-federal relations by prohibiting state court action on a state question.
Another possible alternative for the district court, when it
recognized a potential state-federal conflict, would have been to
62
grant an immediate decree without looking to legislative action
Although a direct decree would probably have the effect of eliminating technical state-federal conflict, it would have necessitated
more federal involvement in state political and legislative affairs
than actually occurred in New York. To accommodate the state
constitution, the federal court would have had to interpret it.6
Furthermore, a direct federal decree would have discouraged the
settlement of many of the issues by the state legislature and
courts. Self-determination on state questions should not be sacrificed to avoid potential judicial clashes.

B. AcTioNs op

TuE STATE CouRTs

Since the federal district court declined to pass on claims under
the state constitution, the task of protecting the remaining requirements of the state constitutional scheme fell to the New
York courts. To perform this task effectively, the New York
60. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 288 F. Supp. 916, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
62. See Note, 72 YAia L.. 968, 1035 (1963).
63. If the state courts did not agree with the interpretation given the
state constitution by the federal courts, a state-federal conflict could still
result. In an analogous situation in Colorado, the state court did not hesitate
to correct the federal court's interpretation. White v. Anderson, 394 P.2d 333
(Colo. 1964). However, the effect of the decision was stayed until after the
federally-ordered election, with two justices dissenting.
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courts had to decide state questions in a manner which would not
compromise federal rights. A state decision standing in the way

of effectuating a declared federal right can be disregarded by the
federal court."
The first decision by the New York Court of Appeals held all

four legislative plans unconstitutional. 5 Plan A was declared unconstitutional because it provided for more than 150 assembly

members. The court must have assumed its decision would protect the state constitution. However, it was unreasonable to expect
the district court to abide by this decision without an alternative

plan complying with both federal and state constitutions. Unless
the legislature were to enact a new plan, or the district court were
informed whether election at large or weighted voting would com-

ply with the state constitution,66 there would be no alternative to
the remaining state constitutional
Plan A, and no assurance that
07
requirements would be met.

64.
Under Baker v. Carr... [plaintiff] is pressing a federal constitutional
right; and if he is correct in his federal constitutional claim, the state
constitutional limitation need not be construed as a bar, for no state
limitation on legislative action can prevent relief which the Federal
Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court, requires.
Valenti v. Dempsey, 211 F. Supp. 911, 913 (D. Conn. 1962).
The specific restraint involved in this situation was the state's interpretation of the constitutional requirement that the legislature reapportion at the
first session after the federal census. It was held that if the legislature did not
reapportion at that time it could not reapportion for ten more years.
65. In the Matter of Orans, 15 N.Y.2d 339, 206 N.E.2d 854, 258 N.Y.S.2d
825 (1965), affirming 45 Misc. 2d 616, 257 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
66. The federal district court in its May decision based its rejection of
weighted voting at least in part on its suspicions that it would be held unconstitutional by the New York courts. Brief for Appellees, pp. 10-11, Travia v.
Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 9 (1965). If either the weighted voting or election at large
were constitutional the state court should have so declared at that time.
The New York Constitution has a number of provisions which appear to be
inconsistent with weighted voting. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 9 provides: "a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business"; § 14 provides:
"nor shall any bill be passed or become a law, except by the assent of a
majority of the members elected to each branch of the legislature ....

";

§ 20

provides: "the assent of 2/3 of the mnembers elected to each branch of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the public moneys or
property for local or private purposes." (Emphasis added.)
67. The federal court's reluctance to become involved in state problems
such as gerrymandering is based on the premise that "when a state exercises
power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal
judicial review." Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960).
It would appear that the state court understood the Supreme Court directive that the reapportionment must be accomplished under a valid plan to
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Furthermore, if the state court sought to protect the state
constitution it should have given guidance to the legislature by
deciding specifically what were the remaining requirements of
the state constitution. s In its April 15 decision, the court of appeals failed to consider the town and block rule and the biennial
election provision 9 Considering the federal time limit, such determination should have been made to facilitate achievement of a
satisfactory plan.
The next court of appeals decision,7" on July 9, enjoined the
holding of an election under Plan A as ordered by the district
courts. The decision was based on findings that Plan A violated
the state constitution in providing for 165 members and one year
terms. An injunction was considered proper since the district
court order was not final and binding. The majority argued that
whether Plan A complied with the state constitution was a state
question to be determined by the New York courts, and that all
federal decisions were based on the assumption that the 1965
election would be held under a valid legislative plan. 71 The district
court, however, had acknowledged on May 10 that Plan A was
no longer a valid statute.7 The majority's reference to previous
mean that the plan must comply with both state and federal constitutions.
Glinski v. Lomenzo, 16 N.Y.2d 27, 209 NXE.2d 277, 261 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1965).
68. The court decided generally which provisions had survived the Supreme Court decision, but it did not interpret these provisions. Such a
decision was particularly necessary with relation to the issue of gerrymandering. Since the basic unit previously had been the county, there was little
precedent to give the legislature knowledge of the extent of their discretion in
forming new districts.
69. The objection to the one year terms provided for in Plan A was not
raised until the July 9 court of appeals decision enjoining the holding of an
election under Plan A. Glinski v. Lomenzo, 16 N.Y.2d 27, 209 N.E.2d 277,
261 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1965).
70. Ibid.
71. The court stated that it would be obligated to permit the November
election if a federal court order
had made final and binding orders therefor. To repeat, I have seen no
such order. All the previous Federal decisions were based on the assumption that the 1964 or the 1965 Legislature would-neither did-pass a
valid legislative districting statute. The May 24, 1965 decision of the
Federal three-man District Court did no more than decline to change
its previous orders. Obviously and under settled principles, the subsequent denial of a stay by the United States Supreme Court decided
nothing. The appeal to that court still pends.
Id. at 29-30, 209 N.E.2d at 278, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
72. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 246 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), for a
printed statement of the oral Mlay 24 order which stated that Plan A was
itself invalid as a New York law.
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federal decisions must have meant, therefore, that no Supreme
Court ruling required New York to hold an election under an
invalid plan. Although it was true that the Supreme Court had
never made such a ruling, it had refused to stay the district court
order to hold an election under Plan A 3
There is little doubt that the method of electing state officials
is solely a state question if the method does not impinge on federal rights. However, it was questionable whether weighted voting
- the court of appeals' solution- satisfied the federal constitution. 4 On May 10, the district court had said that weighted
voting did not fully satisfy the federal constitution.7 5 The court
of appeals may have been contending, however, that the district
court determination on weighted voting was not binding on the
state courts until affirmed by the Supreme Court. Generally, the
provisions of a state constitution can be disregarded only in effectuating federal constitutional rights as construed by the
Supreme Court. 6 In light of this, the Supreme Court's refusal to
stay the effect of the May 24 district court order or accelerate the
appeal was much more significant than the majority admitted.
it was tantamount to approval of the
Under the circumstances,
77
district court order.

73. See Travia v. Lomenzo, 381 U.S. 481 (1965).
74. The district court had held fractional voting unconstitutional. WMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Since fractional voting is
the least offensive form of weighted voting (largest vote is one, disparities are
equalized by fractions under one), all other forms of weighted voting should
be unconstitutional.
75. Brief for Appellees, p. 7, Travia v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 9 (1965).
76. See Valenti v. Dempsey, 211 F. Supp. 911, 913 (D. Conn. 1962); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 229 Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715
(1962). In Delaware, in a situation similar to the one in New York, the federal
district court entered a decree declaring the Delaware constitutional amendment on apportionment to be unconstitutional. It then gave the general assembly a specified period of time to devise a valid plan. The Supreme Court of
Delaware advised -the Governor that, notwithstanding the district court
decision, he should proclaim a redistricting plan in compliance with the amendment. It would seem that the only basis for asserting that the Governor was
not bound by the district court order was that the decision involved a novel
federal question which was being appealed to the Supreme Court. The district
court enjoined the action of the Governor, but on appeal Mr. Justice Brennan
stayed the injunction pending the outcome of the substantive issues in the
Supreme Court. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 701-03 (1964). See also
Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 136 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 1965) (federal questions
finally determined are binding on state courts).
77. Mr. Justice Harlan, in denying a stay of the district court's injunction,
commented that the state court's injunction could have been prevented had
the Supreme Court explained its reasons for denying a stay of the district
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Furthermore, absence of an affirmance by the Supreme Court

was irrelevant if the state court did not have jurisdiction to make
a final determination. Although the respective jurisdiction of state
and federal courts in reapportionment is ambiguous, 8 it is clear
that initially there is concurrent jurisdiction. The relevant question, however, is whether the federal courts, in assuming jurisdiction to implement a Supreme Court reapportionment decision,
do so to the exclusion of the state courts. 9 Generally, in litigation
involving both state and federal questions, in personam jurisdiction remains concurrent until a final decision is reached by one
of the courts.8 0 Reapportionment may be an exception to this
rule. In Oklahoma, the federal district court, having first acquired
jurisdiction, enjoined the state court when it assumed jurisdiction
on issues which would have affected the final outcome.8' The
federal court maintained that the court which first acquires jurisdiction should proceed to a final determination of the issues involved. Because of the limited time and the necessity to settle on
a particular reapportionment plan, circumstances might prohibit
court's May 24 order, Travia v. Lomenzo, 86 Sup. Ct. 7, 9 (1965). In the
Delaware situation the state court action preceded the Supreme Court action
on the stay.
78. Compare Scranton v. Drew, 879 U.S. 40 (1964), where a district court
order was vacated upon a decision by the state court even though the
jurisdiction of the federal court had been invoked first, ith Moss v.
Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Okla. 1963), af'd sub non. Williams
v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964), where the district court successfully enjoined
the state court from deciding reapportionment issues similar to those
before the district court. See also Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 136 N.W.2d 546
(Iowa 1965). The majority in Glinski assumed the jurisdiction was concurrent.
Glinski v. Lomenzo, 16 N.Y.2d 27, 209 N.E.2d 277, 261 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1965).
But the dissenting judges expressed doubts as to the extent of their jurisdiction.
Id. at 31, 209 N.E.2d at 279, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
79. Mr. Justice Harlan, in refusing to stay the district court's injunction
stated that "whether the federal court will . . . defer to the state court
depends not on the Supremacy Clause, but on the exercise of discretion by
the federal court pursuant to considerations of comity inherent in federalism."
Travia v. Lomenzo, 86 Sup. Ct. 7, 9 (1965). This statement seems to indicate
that the jurisdiction of the federal court is exclusive unless it chooses to defer
to the state court.
80. Mandeville v. Canterbury, 318 U.S. 47, 49 (1948); Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230, 235 (1922); W. E. Stewart Land Co. v. Arthur,
267 Fed. 184 (8th Cir. 1920); Dunn v. Stewart, 235 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Miss.
1964). If the proceeding is in rem, the jurisdiction first invoked is exclusive.
See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941); Green v. Green,
259 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1958).
81. Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Okla. 1963), af'd sub nom.
Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964).
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state court action on a state question because the action could
jeopardize the holding of any election s2 If this is the law, the
New York courts, while perhaps having jurisdiction to decide state
questions, would not have had jurisdiction to make a final determination. Their role would have been limited to advising the
federal courts on state law.
It is unclear whether the solution suggested by the concurring
opinion,83 an election at large, would comply with the New York
Constitution."4 However, sanction thereof by the majority of the
court of appeals would have made it difficult for the district court
to ignore this solution. If an election at large does not violate "one
man, one vote," and if the federal court's only objection to it was
lack of knowledge of its state constitutionality, the choice of this
remedy over Plan A would have been solely a state question. However, the question of the state court's jurisdiction would have
remained.
V. PROPOSALS TO FACILITATE STATE-FEDERAL
COOPERATION IN REAPPORTIONMENT
Under the circumstances of the New York situation, the district court decision to order an election under a federally acceptable plan which violated the state constitution seems justifiable.
However, the method which has been chosen by the federal courts
to achieve reapportionment is objectionable. In essence, the
method is to permit the states to reapportion with the federal
courts maintaining a check on the remedies. The form of the
check is a federal court decision at the end of the stipulated time
period, based on equitable considerations. However, the absence
of explicit federal standards places a burden on the states in propounding remedies. The state can not afford to leave reapportionment entirely to the federal courts since there is no guarantee they
will implement state constitutional requirements. s5 The combination of necessary state action and no federal standards often leads
to state-federal conflict rather than cooperation.
82. Although there is no reapportionment case directly in point, it would
seem that there are some limits to the federal court power. In Anderson v.
Kentucky, 288 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1961), it was held that federal courts do
not have jurisdiction to restrain judges of state courts from performing a discretionary duty which does not violate federal constitutional rights.
83. Glinski v. Lomenzo, 16 N.Y.d 27, 30, 209 N.E.2d 277, 279, 261

N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 (1965).

84. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. IH, §§ 3, 5.
85. See Nolan v. Rhodes, 34 U.S,. WEEK 3281 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1966); White

v. Anderson, 394 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1964).
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The failure of the federal courts to set guidelines is particularly
detrimental when the state legislature arrives at a solution which
is likely to be invalid under the state constitution. Since the state
courts may be unwilling to reapportion, they turn to weighted
voting or an election at large as temporary remedies. To avoid
the use of these alternatives, federal courts have resorted to the
invalid legislative plan if they found that state interests would
not be seriously infringed.
One alternative to the method used in New York would facilitate state-federal cooperation -a
holding that weighted voting
and election at large are not federally acceptable. There have been
indications that such is the case. s8 In January the district court
held fractional voting unconstitutional as a permanent solutionYs
On May 24, the court considered weighted voting as a temporary
solution and stated that it did not fully satisfy the federal consti88
tution.
There has been less intimation that elections at large are
federally objectionable, but the argument can be made. 9 The
86. There appears to be a discernible trend away from both weighted
voting and elections at large even as threatened remedies for reapportionment. For cases which have rejected weighted voting, see Thigpen v. Meyers,
211 F. Supp. 826 (WD. Wash. 1962); League of Nebraska Municipalities v.
Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189, 195 (D. Neb. 1962); Brown v. State Election Bd.,
369 P.2d 140 (Okla. 1962). An election at large has been used only in Illinois
as a remedy. It was rejected as a remedy in League of Nebraska Municipalities
v. Marsh, 232 F. Supp. 411, 414 (D. Neb. 1962). But 8ee League of Nebraska
Municipalities v. Marsh, 242 F. Supp. 357 (D. Neb. 1965). Traditional methods of districting have been utilized whenever possible. In Sims v. Frink, 208
F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962), the court rejected weighted voting and an
election at large, and put together the best features of existing plans as a
temporary measure. This procedure met with the express approval of the
Supreme Court. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964). See also Scott v.
Germano, 881 U.S. 407 (1965); Butterworth v. Dempsey, 237 F. Supp. 302
(1965).
87. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Actually all four plans were temporary measures. No permanent solution could
have been achieved until the 1968 elections. Delegates for a constitutional
convention are to be elected in 1966. The legislature and the people will vote
on any proposed amendment in 1967, and it will be put into effect in 1968.
88. Brief for Appellee, p. 7, Travia v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 9 (1965).
89. Two federal district courts have held multiple districts requiring a
number of representatives to be elected at large to violate the federal constitution. Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa. 1964); Dorsey v.
Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1964). However in Fortson v. Dorsey,
379 U.S. 433 (1965), the Supreme Court rejected the contention that multiple
districts were per se violations of the federal constitution. But the Court left
open the question of constitutionality of multiple districts when actual mini-
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Supreme Court has indicated that "one man, one vote" as applied
to state legislatures means each voter should belong to a district
which is substantially equal in population to all other districtsf0
Since an election at large results in each legislator representing the
whole, it may be inconsistent with the Supreme Court decision.
The method ignores the need of voters to be represented as citizens
of towns and counties as well as citizens of the stateY1 An election
at large would deny such representation to all voters except those
in the more populous areas. Secondly, an election at large could
easily deny minority interests a voice. 2 It would not seem unreasonable to conclude that the right of a person to an equal vote in
a legislative election is only satisfied if he has both an equal vote
and an equal district - at least in those states with extreme variations in population density and a number of minority interests.
Holding elections at large and weighted voting to be unacceptable would delineate the boundaries within which state courts
must operate. When the state legislature fails to reapportion, the
mization of voting strength is demonstrated:
In reversing the District Court we should emphasize 'that the equal protection claim below was based upon an alleged infirmity that attaches
to the statute on its face .... It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the
circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population. When this is demonstrated it will be time enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster.
879 U.S. at 438-39.

Multimember districts have been held unconstitutional under this rationale
in Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96, 107 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Holt v. Richardson,
240 F. Supp. 724 (D. Hawaii 1965). But see Boineau v. Thornton, 235 F. Supp.
175 (E.D.S.C. 1964), af'd, S79 U.S. 15 (1964). Election at large presents a
stronger case for unconstitutionality than does a multiple district. See Dixon,
Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle
for Fair Representation, 63 Mcn. L. Rzv. 209, 220 (1964). Compare League
of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 232 F. Supp. 411, 414 (D. Neb. 1964),
which refused to use election at large because it is unworkable and inconsistent
with the tradition of a legislature, with League of Nebraska Municipalities v.
Marsh, 242 F. Supp. 357 (D. Neb. 1965), which refused to redistrict but
threatened the legislature with an election at large.
90. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964).
91. Counties and towns, as subdivisions of the state, depend on the legislature for authorization to do many acts. N.Y. CoNST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2. The
inequality of an election at large is particularly acute when special legislation is prevalent.
92. This could be mitigated to some extent by allowing some form of

cumulative voting. But such a technique would compound the confusion of
an election at large, and might run afoul of the "one man, one vote" standard
itself.
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state court would either have to do the redistricting itself or leave
the matter to the federal courts. The possibility of a direct confrontation between state and federal courts would be minimized.
A second alternative which would lessen the probability of
conflict would be for the federal court to apply the doctrine of
equitable abstention 3 After setting a time period, the court
would postpone the exercise of federal jurisdiction and remit the
issue to the state courts for a determination of both state and
federal questions0 4 This would eliminate the confused and timeconsuming process of a dual trial of the issues. The state courts
would be encouraged to assume a role of active supervision because their role as enforcer of federal rights would take them out
of their co-equal status with the state legislature. 5 An extension
of this method which might further facilitate achievement of a
plan satisfactory to both the state and federal courts would be a
joint effort between the two courts to devise a districting plan if
the legislature fails to produce a valid plan 6
In abstaining, the federal courts would retain jurisdiction
93. See Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and Its Implicationsfor American Federalism, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 678
(1962); Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federaien:= The Federal
Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F..TD. 481 (1960).
94. The federal courts have abstained in a few cases, see Scott v. Germano,
381 U.S. 407 (1965); Scranton v. Drew, 379 U.S. 40 (1964), but they have
left the initiative to intervene on the state courts. A more consistent policy of
remission to the state courts would encourage even the most reluctant state
court to assume responsibility.
95. Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals indicate that state courts
will do little more than determine whether the legislature has properly complied with state constitutional provisions. See In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 52
N.E.2d 97 (1943); In re Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E. 545 (1916); In re
Sherill, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907). The state court as a co-equal branch
with the state legislature does not believe it has the power to become involved
in reapportionment since the constitution gave this duty exclusively to the
state legislature. Burns v. Flynn, 268 N.Y. 601, 198 N.E. 424 (1935). See
Sweeney v. Nolte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962), in which the court doubted its
authority as a co-equal with the legislature to supervise reapportionment
because supervision could be "in the nature of a mandamus by duress." Id. at
303. This attitude places the fate of the state constitution in the hands of a
reluctant legislature. If the legislature fails to act and the state courts also
refuse to act, the likelihood that state constitutional provisions will not be
effectuated is great.
96. People ex rel. Scott v. Kerner, 33 Ill. Rd 460, 211 N.E.2d 736 (1965)
(federal district court joined in action to devise congressional districts); People
ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 33 III. 2d 11, 211 N.E.2d 165 (1965) (federal court
joined in action to devise state senate districts).
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pending the outcome of the state court decision 7 The federal
courts would thus retain a supervisory position while being relieved of much of the direct involvement in state affairs. Equitable
abstention would be particularly advantageous if weighted voting
and election at large were eliminated as alternatives. The solution
would be state derived and there could be considerable confidence
that the districting plan would satisfy both state and federal
constitutions.
There may be situations, however, in which abstention on
federal issues would not be desirable. 8 If it is necessary that the
federal courts decide the federal issues, they should assume exclusive jurisdiction. The uncertainty of concurrent jurisdiction
might jeopardize effective preelection procedures in addition to
jeopardizing the election. Assuming the federal court obtains
jurisdiction first, necessity is a sufficient basis for exclusive jurisdictionP9
97. Friedelbaum, supra note 93, at 701; cf. Catoggio v. Grogan, 149 F.
Supp. 91 (D.NJ. 1957).
98. If there had already been substantial delay, or if there were important
issues of fact which the federal court thought were essential to the federal
question, or if it were unlikely that the state court would be able to deal with
the reapportionment issue, the federal courts might not want to abstain. See
ALI STiY OF TE Divsiox oF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND JEDERA
COURTS, 67-80 (Tentative Draft No. 8, April 1965).
99. See United States v. 625.91 Acres of Land, 49 F. Supp. 997 (E.D. Alo.
1943).

